La guerre d’Algérie a montré à la France la face la plus cruelle de son armée. Le FLN alégrien n’a pas échappé à la barbarie. 

Toute guerre charrie son lot d’inhumanités, d’exactions, d’actions arbitraires, généralement commis par des armées régulières. Surtout quand elles sont en face de groupes de type guérilla et/ou terroristes, sans aucune morale, sans aucun respect des Lois de la guerre.

Source : Mehdi Mekdour, chercheur au GRIP, 26 août 2011

As Ansar Dine’s power grows, the group is cultivating ties with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM, a formal franchise of al-Qaeda since 2006, emerged out of radical Islamist groups in Algeria’s 1992–2002 civil war. Officially, AQIM hopes to topple regional governments and replace them with an Islamic state, but to some extent the group functions as a for-profit criminal network. Since the mid-2000s, AQIM has kidnapped Western tourists in the Sahara, skirmished with soldiers in Sahelian countries, and bombed embassies in Mauritania and the United Nations building in Algeria. AQIM has used northern Mali as one of its staging grounds, but it has never before participated openly in administering territory.

Analysts believe AQIM is divided into several factions, some of them more criminal than ideological, but one factional commander, Abdulmalik Droukdel, has instructed his men to support Ansar Dine. Droukdel’s ambitions are long term, and his political sense somewhat cautious: He has advised Ansar Dine to avoid conflict with the MNLA and introduce Islamic law gradually. The Ansar Dine-AQIM alliance raises fears that northern Mali will become a “safe haven” for transnational terrorists.

Back in Bamako, the transitional government possesses neither the administrative capacity nor the political clarity that would be necessary to retake the north. What implications, then, do Mali’s twin crises have for its neighbors and for the United States?

Source : The American Interest, Alex Thurston, June 7, 2012,

Regional Implications

Mali’s instability poses four major problems for the region. The first is refugees. Since January, more than 260,000 Malians have fled their homes. Mali’s refugees add to last year’s influx of displaced persons from Libya into the Sahel. The new refugees burden communities and governments that have already stretched resources thin: Drought in the Sahel has left an estimated 15 million people without sufficient food.

The second problem is that the Tuareg rebellion could spread. In neighboring Niger, the government has so far preserved a working relationship with Tuareg leaders. But even if Niger avoids rebellion, no government in the region supports independence for Azawad, whose existence might awaken separatist desires elsewhere and complicate the diplomatic life of other states.

The third problem is AQIM. Kidnappings by AQIM have harmed the economies of Niger, Mauritania, and Mali for several years. With the current conflict in northern Mali, some of the last remaining Westerners have left the region, and few tourists will return any time soon. Meanwhile, gunmen from an AQIM splinter group kidnapped seven Algerian diplomats in Gao in April, putting the Algerian government in the unenviable position of conducting extended negotiations with criminals. AQIM’s foothold in northern Mali will worry Mauritania, Niger and Algeria, all of whose armies clash periodically with the group. Mauritania, which hunted AQIM fighters inside Mali in 2010 and 2011, recently stepped up military exercises near its border with Mali.

The fourth problem is that, while the prospect of a coup does not necessarily loom over every other regime in the region, the fall of a government with internationally renowned democratic credentials is a blow to the region’s reputation. Events in Mali could make foreign investors think twice about investing in the region: Already, gold investors have seen their stocks plummet overnight, and South Africa’s Illovo Sugar recently pulled up stakes. West African governments would prefer that their part of the continent make headlines for things other than military takeovers and Islamist violence.

Regional Response and U.S. Interests

Regional powers have focused on promoting civilian rule in southern Mali. ECOWAS, which responded rapidly and decisively not only to the coup in Mali but also to the April coup in Guinea-Bissau, is keen to make West African military takeovers a thing of the past. But ECOWAS also wants to see northern Mali return to Bamako’s control.

ECOWAS has discussed sending troops to Mali. Details, however, are scant. The proposed force might have responsibility both for supervising the civilian transition and for helping the Malian army reclaim the north. But the junta in Mali opposes the idea. The force, moreover, might have only 3,000 troops, and it’s unclear how ECOWAS would either find or fund those troops. ECOWAS has requested assistance from the United Nations, as well as authorization to deploy troops to Mali. France, whose special forces helped decide a post-election conflict in Cote d’Ivoire in 2011, is another potential source of support, but the outlines of newly elected French President Francois Hollande’s Africa policies are not yet clear. ECOWAS has also asked the United States for help. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carsontold reporters on May 23 that the U.S. is “willing to provide logisticians and planners . . . but the mission and role must be defined before we make any kind of commitment.”

Does the United States have interests at stake in Mali? To the extent that Mali’s crises disrupt regional stability, allow al-Qaeda’s affiliates to expand and facilitate the circulation of powerful weapons, the situation there does affect American interests, broadly defined. In a sense, the rise of Ansar Dine and AQIM in northern Mali seems to confirm the gloomy predictions that have circulated since 9/11 about ungoverned spaces in the Sahara becoming safe havens for transnational terrorists with aspirations to attack America. At the same time, for top officials in Washington, most global investors and international media outlets, Mali is peripheral. The rapidly shifting political winds in northern Mali, moreover, mean that Ansar Dine’s (and AQIM’s) moment in the political sun may prove relatively brief. Mali in 2012 is not Afghanistan in 1994; there is still a real central government, and the rebels have no support from neighboring regimes.

So far, Washington’s response to Mali’s troubles looks like a continuation of its approach toward other crises in West Africa: condemning coups, cutting off aid to coup-torn countries, and working through regional partners to contain violent movements. The U.S. government, whose counterterrorism partnership with Algeria has deepened in the past decade, may lean more on Algiers in dealing with AQIM. Mauritania, as noted above, has a role as well; neither Algeria nor Mauritania belongs to ECOWAS, meaning they are not bound by its decisions in determining their own responses to the conflict in Mali.

Many African governments, including Nigeria, which is one of the main powers in ECOWAS, strongly oppose the idea of America deploying combat troops in Africa. (Opposition notwithstanding, the Pentagon has conducted numerous training exercises in West Africa through its Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership and predecessor programs; indeed, Captain Sanogo benefited from U.S. training). But if ECOWAS defines its mission in Mali and musters the necessary troops, Washington has indicated it will participate in some form.

The chances of such an intervention will increase if the situation in Mali worsens. If soldiers stifle change in Bamako, and the Ansar Dine-AQIM alliance continues to hold territory in the north, Mali will become a bigger topic of discussion in Washington, Paris, and at ECOWAS’ now-frequent summits.

Source : The Crisis in Mali,The American Interest,  Alex Thurston, June 7, 2012

Last week the satirical French paper Canard Enchaîné reported that Qatar has allegedly been funding armed groups in northern Mali made their way into Algerian and west African outlets. Suspicions that Ansar Ed-Dine, the main pro-shari’ah armed group in the region, has been receiving funding from Qatar has circulated in Mali for several months. Reports (as yet unconfirmed) that a ‘Qatari’ aircraft landed at Gao, full of weapons, money and drugs, for example, emerged near the beginning of the conflict. The original report cites a French military intelligence report as indicating that Qatar has provided financial support to all three of the main armed groups in northern Mali: Iyad Ag Ghali’s Ansar Ed-Dine, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). The amount of funding given to each of the groups is not mentioned but it mentions repeated reports from the French DGSE to the Defense Ministry have mentioned Qatar’s support for ‘terrorism’ in northern Mali.

Jeune Afrique mentions that the report is likely to increase tensions between Algiers and Doha, pointing to possible contention over hydrocarbons in northern Mali and disagreements over Qatar’s aggressive support for Arab uprisings, which has irritated Algiers. (The original report mentions discussions between Total and Qatar on energy in Mali.) The first question to ask about a story like this is what and where is the source for the French source on this? While knowledgeable sources in west Africa have alleged Qatar has been ‘supporting’ at least one armed group in Mali their reports tend to mention Ansar Ed-Dine specifically and not the secular MNLA, the well known al-Qa’ida affiliate AQIM or its splinter, MUJWA. That Qatar is backing all of these groups is new and unique to the Canard Enchaîné report. One wonders if Algerian reporting (the French had to have gotten this information from someplace) has to do with this particular accusation going beyond Ansar Ed-Dine. Even if this is not the case the Canard Enchaîné report is worth thinking about in the wider political context.

The aggressive coverage this report has gotten in the Algerian press fits strongly within anarrative that emerged chiefly in the context of the Libyan uprising, in which Qatar is presented as recklessly seeking to destabilise the broader region by financing and armed Islamist rebel groups. The Qatari objective in this narrative has something to do with so spreading fanatical Wahabi ideology and destablising oil and gas rich states as a means of gaining access to their resources. This is part of a larger narrative about the Arab risings, which presents Algeria as a bastion of stability being encircled by Islamist forces. This was evident, for example, in a significant part of the press coverage around the appointment of Gen. Bachir Tartag. Elsewhere, Qatar is presented as seeking to force an uprising in Algeria through foul means. El Watan, La Tribune, DNA, and a number of other outlets covered the Canard Enchaîné story as evidence of a large Qatari conspiracy against Algeria. El Watan’s 07 June report links the charges in the Canard Enchaîné report to Qatar’s supposed efforts to a wider ‘campaign to fund Islamist terrorism in the Muslim world,’ while noting that Doha’s supposed funding of the MNLA, AQIM, Ansar Ed-Dine and MUJWA ‘is not accidental. It is aimed primarily at destablising Algeria, which has resisted until now the tide of the green peril.’ La Tribune‘s report includes the following lines:

Qatar wants to destabilize the entire region from North Africa to the Mashreq without worrying about the political and security consequences that result. Today, Libya has been delivered to itself, Egypt will not know stability any time soon, and Tunisia tries hard to silence its demons. As in Mali, it [Qatar] risks the implosion and the threat of civil war as well as in Syria.

DNA writes, ‘in short, the emirs of Qatar fund armed Islamists, who spread terror in Algeria and the Sahel, holding Algerian hostages and proclaiming an Islamic Caliphate on Algeria’s frontiers.’ The report repeats a mantra heard among many leaders in the Sahel that northern Mali is at risk of becoming ‘another Afghanistan’ (this is a common refrain in western circles too). DNA’s report also mentions Qatar’s supposed interest in ‘the oil of the Sahel’.

It should be noted that public reports of Qatari ‘support’ for Ansar Ed-Dine and other armed groups in Mali are almost always vague, imprecise and generally accusatory rather than empirical. In this way they are similar to accusations often heard in pro-MNLA and French circles that Algeria is secretly backing Ansar Ed-Dine, based on its past relationship with Iyad Ag Ghali prior to his transformation into a Salafi-jihadi. While these reports tend to point toward anecdotal evidence or gut feelings, such claims are similarly light in sourcing and similarly politicised, constructing grand designs for Algiers in northern Mali based on energy or Algeria’s own internal politics, or based on Keenanite theories of Algeria’s perception of the Sahel and its activities there.

There is also something to be said on style here. In evaluating reports of ‘Algerian support’ and ‘Qatari support’ for this or that organisation or group, one should be careful to note previous, established patterns of behaviour in Mali and elsewhere. The Algerians do not deploy forces outside their own borders for the sake of foreign proxies unless they feel there is something vital at stake; the only such example of this in Algerian history is Algeria’s participation in the Western Sahara conflict. Its involvement in northern Mali has not followed this model, where it tends to bring specific individuals under its influence through various means who are then instrumentalised in implementing Algiers-led negotiations or accords — agents in place and agents of influence. Algiers sent advisors to Kidal in late 2011 and pulled them out at very beginning of the conflict; their role was likely to assess the atmospherics in the area, gather intelligence not to be involved in combat. If the Algerians have used cash or the other means to establish agents in place within Ansar Ed-Dine or other groups is this utterly different than ‘controlling’ or ‘supporting’ an organisation (‘control’ must almost always be qualified because ‘control’ in the process of politics or war is almost always relative control). The MNLA was aggressively public in seeking Algerian support early on in the conflict, making more or less empty promises about fighting AQIM from the very start of the rebellion. The Algerians, uninterested in the MNLA’s independence agenda and probably also reluctant to become deeply involved in the conflict — as a means of trying to preserve their role as a mediator — rebuffed these overtures over time. Predictably, pro-MNLA and other interested media outlets have accused Algiers of taking the other side or of deliberately remaining aloof from the conflict as a means of expanding a zone of ‘hegemony‘ in the region.

In a hazy situation as in northern Mali, reporting is negatively impacted by information fed by biased sources seeking to discredit their foes, provide answers to questions they may feel they cannot otherwise explain due to poor information using extrapolation, rumours, and so on. People who are otherwise reliable may not have access or knowledge of the current situation in the ways they used to under previous conditions. Everything is turned inside and everyone wants answers. Strong claims make explanations easier in a climate of uncertainty.

Claims of Qatari support for armed groups in Mali are not preposterous though as yet unconfirmed. If there are Qatari princes who are providing money to groups in northern Mali and the government of Qatari is turning the blind eye or is unaware this is one thing; if the government of Qatar, as policy, is sending money to any of these groups this is something else. Right now little is known in public that is concrete and verified. If there is indeed Qatari money moving to the rebel groups in northern Mali it is more likely to be along the lines of the first scenario, rather than the second, based on the example of Qatari involvement with al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s, where individuals who were also involved in aid or religious activities became close to al-Qa’ida operatives and similar organisations. Limited Qatari interest in northern Mali and the Sahel can be traced back at least to the 1980s when Qataris, with other Gulf Arabs, were active in helping to establish Islamic charities and relief groups which also tended to help spread these groups’ religious agendas. Similar activities continue in the region today. At the end of the day, though, there is still this report adding new variables and new questions — and there are still more questions than answers.

Source : Themoornextdoor.wordpress.com, 10 June, 2012

Manuscript received 1 October 2011; accepted 15 October 2011

Author :

Hans Krech is the managing director of the Scientific Forum for International
Security (Wissenschaftliches Forum für Internationale Sicherheit e.V. – WIFIS)
at the German Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr), in Hamburg, Germany. Captain (reserve) Krech is
the author of numerous security policy studies.

Document attached : http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/viewFile/464/462

Les trois grandes mosquées de Tombouctou, restaurées par l’imam Al-Aqib au XVI^e siècle, témoignent de l’âge d’or de la capitale intellectuelle et spirituelle de la fin de la dynastie Askia. Elles ont joué un rôle essentiel dans la diffusion de l’islam en Afrique à une époque ancienne.

On pense que Tombouctou a été fondé vers la fin du V^e siècle de l’hégire par un groupe de Touaregs Imakcharen qui, ayant voyagé sur 250 km au sud de leur base, établirent un camp temporaire gardé par une vieille femme, Bouctou. Peu à peu, Tim-Bouctou (le lieu de Bouctou) devint un petit village sédentaire à la croisée de plusieurs routes commerciales. Très tôt convertie à l’islam (les deux grandes mosquées de Djingareyber et de Sankore ont été construites au cours de la période mandingue), la ville-marché de Tombouctou a atteint son apogée sous la dynastie Askia (1493-1591). Elle devint ensuite un important centre de culture coranique, avec l’université de Sankore et de nombreuses écoles fréquentées, dit-on, par quelque 25 000 élèves. Dans les rues de ce centre intellectuel et religieux, savants, ingénieurs et architectes venus de différentes parties de l’Afrique se mêlaient aux sages et aux marabouts. Très tôt, Tombouctou attira les voyageurs venus de pays lointains.

Bien que les mosquées d’El-Hena, Kalidi et Algoudour Djingareye aient été détruites, trois monuments essentiels – les mosquées de Djingareyber, de Sankore et de Sidi Yahia – témoignent encore aujourd’hui de la grandeur de Tombouctou.

La mosquée de Djingareyber a été construite par le sultan Kankan Moussa après son retour d’un pèlerinage à La Mecque, en 1325. Entre 1570 et 1583, l’imam de Tombouctou, Al-Aqib, la fit reconstruire et agrandir en ajoutant toute sa partie sud et le mur de clôture du cimetière situé à l’ouest. Le minaret central domine la ville ; c’est le principal point de repère dans le paysage urbain actuel. Sur la façade orientale, un minaret moins haut complète le profil de la grande mosquée, qui possède trois cours internes.

Comme la mosquée de Djingareyber, celle de Sankore, construite au cours de la période mandingue, a été restaurée par l’imam Al-Aqib entre 1578 et 1582. Ayant fait démolir le sanctuaire, il le reconstruisit en reproduisant les mesures de la Kabaa à La Mecque, qu’il avait prises lui-même avec une corde au cours de son pèlerinage.

La mosquée de Sidi Yahia, au sud de celle de Sankore, a probablement été construite vers 1400 par le marabout Cheikh El-Moktar Hamalla pour anticiper la venue d’un saint homme qui apparut effectivement 40 ans plus tard en la personne de Cherif Sidi Yahia, qui fut alors choisi comme imam. Elle a été restaurée en 1557-78 par l’imam Al-Aqib. Outre les mosquées, le site classé compte 16 cimetières et mausolées qui étaient des composantes essentielles du système religieux dans la mesure où, selon la croyance populaire, ils étaient le rempart qui protégeait la ville de tous les dangers. Le mausolée le plus ancien est celui de Cheikh Abul Kassim Attouaty, qui mourut en l’an 936 de l’hégire (1529) et fut enterré 150 m à l’ouest de la ville, avec 50 oulémas et saints hommes originaires de Touat. De la même période, les tombeaux du savant Sidi Mahmoudou, qui mourut en 955 de l’hégire, et celui de l’imam Al-Aqib, le restaurateur des mosquées, qui mourut en l’an 991 de l’hégire (1583), présentent également un grand intérêt.

Source : UNESCO/CLT/WHC

L’ensemble des institutions spécialisées et professionnels du patrimoine se joignent à l’Ecole du Patrimoine Africain-EPA pour lancer le présent appel, véritable cri du cœur et d’inquiétude extrême face à l’urgence pour la sauvegarde du patrimoine culturel du Mali en tant que bien de l’Afrique et de l’humanité toute entière. Cet appel fait suite à la crise aigue qui, depuis le 24 mars 2012, touche le Nord de la république du Mali avec la présence des forces du MNLA, de Ansar Ad-Din, AQMI et autres groupes armés fondamentalistes, provoquant une situation des plus tragiques qui fait craindre le pire pour le devenir du patrimoine culturel du Mali reconnu pour sa civilisation millénaire.

En effet, les récentes profanations de deux mausolées de Saints à Tombouctou, classés au patrimoine mondial de l’Unesco, perpétrées le vendredi 4 mai par des groupes fondamentalistes d’Ansar Ad-Din, ainsi que les fortes menaces qui pèsent sur tous les biens situés dans le nord, viennent confirmer la crainte des institutions spécialisées et professionnels du patrimoine très préoccupés par la tragique situation générale du patrimoine au Mali, qu’il convient de dénoncer et de condamner avec la plus grande fermeté.

Le Mali, il convient de le rappeler, possède un patrimoine culturel extrêmement riche et varié qui constitue une preuve éloquente de la contribution de l’Afrique à la civilisation universelle. En témoignent les nombreux manuscrits anciens de Tombouctou (capitale intellectuelle et spirituelle, centre de propagation de l’islam en Afrique aux XIVè, XVè et XVIè siècles), les célèbres édifices de terre et structures de villes anciennes, les terres cuites du delta intérieur du Niger, autant d’exemples qui signent les traditions séculaires qui ont forgé l’histoire des grands empires du sahel à la savane. Aujourd’hui, ce pays compte quatre sites tangibles inscrits sur la Liste du patrimoine mondial de l’UNESCO : les villes anciennes de Djenné (1988) ; Tombouctou (1988) ; les Falaises de Bandiagara, pays dogon (1989) et le Tombeau des Askia, Gao (2004). Citons également six éléments inscrits sur les Listes représentative et de sauvegarde urgente du patrimoine culturel immatériel de l’humanité, à savoir l’Espace culturel du yaaral et du degal (2008) ; la réfection septennale du toit du Kamablon (2009) ; la Charte du Mandé, proclamée à Kouroukan fouga (2009) ; le Sanké mon, rite de pêche collective dans le Sanké (2009) ; les pratiques et expressions culturelles liées au balafon des communautés Sénoufo du Mali et du Burkina Faso (2011) et la société secrète des Kôrêdugaw,  rite de sagesse du Mali (2011).

Timbuktu-manuscripts-astronomy-mathematics

De nombreux marqueurs et lieux du patrimoine plus récents tels les musées, monuments, mémoriaux, conservatoires, centres et espaces culturels sont autant d’indicateurs culturels témoignant du dynamisme culturel et intellectuel du Mali aujourd’hui malheureusement sous la double menace de l’intolérance, du pillage et du trafic illicite de ses biens culturels.

A cela s’ajoute une grave crise humanitaire qui se manifeste par un déplacement massif des populations, celles du nord notamment , tant à l’intérieur qu’en direction des pays frontaliers , dans des conditions extrêmement difficiles, faites d’insécurité et d’humiliation comme on peut s’y attendre. Ainsi, à la date du 5 avril 2012, le nombre de population déplacé dont une majorité de femmes, d’enfants et de jeunes, était estimé à plus de 235 000 âmes selon le Bureau de coordination des affaires humanitaires du système des Nations Unies. Or, ce qu’un pays a de plus précieux, c’est son patrimoine culturel et ses hommes, en particulier sa jeunesse.

Les menaces sécuritaire, économique et identitaire engendrées par cette situation tragique ainsi que les effets collatéraux, s’inscrivent aussi bien dans un contexte géopolitique plus global qui risque de déstabiliser durablement toute la région sahélienne et bien au-delà.

Face à ce constat catastrophique, le présent appel se veut une opportunité exceptionnelle de constituer un réseau de plaidoyer et de pression afin d’informer et de sensibiliser l’opinion nationale et internationale.

A cet effet, l’application des Conventions internationales relatives à la protection du patrimoine culturel, naturel et immatériel interpelle aujourd’hui la Communauté internationale, notamment l’Unesco et les autres institutions internationales et régionales en charge du patrimoine pour des actions rapides ; il conviendrait d’évaluer les menaces et dégâts sur les biens, d’organiser des rencontres professionnelles sur cette question. Ces cercles de réflexion trouveront un appui substantiel dans la « Convention pour la protection des biens culturels en cas de conflit armé adoptée à la Haye – 1954 » ; la « Convention 1972 de l’Unesco concernant la protection du patrimoine mondial culturel et naturel »; la « Convention concernant les mesures à prendre pour interdire et empêcher l’importation, l’exportation et le transfert de propriété illicites des biens culturels – 1970» et la « Convention pour la sauvegarde du patrimoine culturel immatériel - 2003 ».

Notre appel s’adresse également à la responsabilité de toutes les autorités politiques et administratives ainsi qu’à l’armée nationale de la République du Mali afin que l’intérêt supérieur de la nation malienne prime pour assurer un processus soutenu de retour à l’ordre constitutionnel et à la normalisation dans le nord du pays.

Cet appel invite aussi tous les protagonistes sur le terrain à veiller au strict respect, à la préservation, à l’intégrité et la sécurité des biens culturels et des personnes dans toutes leurs composantes et dimensions, notamment dans les zones de crise à Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal et partout ailleurs au Mali.

Enfin, nous demandons aux pays voisins du Mali dont nous louons le sens de l’hospitalité et de la solidarité africaine de veiller, pour éviter d’éventuels transferts illicites d’objets et œuvres d’art du Mali, à l’efficacité des contrôles par leurs services de douanes et de gendarmeries aux frontières.

Source :

1) Porto-Novo, le 23 mai 2012, Mise à jour le Mardi, 05 Juin 2012 15:37 - http://epa-prema.net/fr/component/content/article/370-appel-mali.html

2) en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timbuktu_Manuscripts